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The Evolution Of Labor Market Discrimination
In Duopsony Contests
Gregory N. Price
Department of Economics
North Carolina A&T State University
Greensboro, NC 27411
I. Introduction
The standard treatment of labor market discrimination by Becker (1974) assumes that firm owners have a
"distaste" for blacks. In equilibrium firms tradeoff the disutility of black employment for profits, resulting
in wage differential between equally qualified black and white workers. In this paper, whether or not a
whiteowned firm discriminates against black labor is determined by a genetically programmed behavioral
phenotype. It is maintained that such a genetic embedding is plausible if fitness maximization is an
objective of the human species. Tastes for discrimination are cast in an evolutionary context, where
individual firms desire to maximize their fitness. Given that genetic inheritance processes evolve slowly,
one could in principle object to using a genetic model of the firm to evaluate discrimination. However,
following Ursprung (1988), one can argue that the greatest part of human history to date, has been
characterized by situations in which man has lived under the permanent threat of death. It it reasonable
therefore to view preferences as having evolved through the process of natural selection.

II. A Model of Duopsonistic Competition
The market consists of a large and finite population of whiteowned sole proprietorships that produce an
identical output. The firms compete in random pairwise duopsony contests. Both firms compete against
each other for two units of homogeneous of black labor. The competition is stylized as a "fitness" contest in
the sense that each firm needs at least one unit of black labor to produce a good that enhances fitness. In
particular, the two firms are concerned with maximizing Darwinian fitness, defined as the conditionally
expected number of offspring. It is assumed that each firm owner breeds true, all offspring are male, and
have the identical behavioral phenotype of the parent. Each unit of produced output sells for a constant
price of one, which is equal to the marginal cost of production. It is assumed that the expected number of
offspring for the firm owner is proportional to firm profit, and that in the absence of profit, Darwinian
fitness is zero. Each unit of black labor has a constant marginal product, and the firm's have a production
function given by q = Lr, where q is output, L is labor input, and r > 0 is a parameter measuring the
elasticity of output with respect to black labor input. The wage that firms pay black labor is determined by
a behavioral phenotype that is genetically programmed. Two phenotypes are possible. A firm can either
have a phenotype that makes it not discriminate against black labor by paying a wage equal to its marginal
product, or a firm can have a phenotype that makes it discriminate against black labor by paying a wage of
one half of its marginal product. It is assumed that each unit of black labor has no opportunities for firm
ownership, and that their fitness depends upon obtaining employment with one of the whiteowned
duopsonists. Given that a firm discriminates and the rival does not, the rival firm bids away all the labor in
the market, and the discriminating firm is unable to achieve fitness. This is a "loss of fitness" cost, and it
captures the essence of strategic interactions in the labor market that may characterize duopsony.
Given the two possible behavioral phenotypes, two types of strategists are possible in the population of
firms. Firms that are genetically programmed to pay black labor one half of its marginal product are
"Illiberal" strategists, and firms that are genetically programmed to pay black labor its marginal product are
"Liberal" strategists. An equilibrium in this model will be characterized by each firm offering a wage to
black labor that maximizes fitness. In principle, there are four possible outcomes, and the equilibrium that
emerges requires a solution concept. The approach adopted below will allow the equilibrium to depend
upon genetic behavioral phenotypes the owners of the firms have.

III. Equilibrium and Invadability with Asexual Reproduction
For random pairwise contests between firms, the gains to Darwinian fitness are a function of the behavioral
phenotype and returns to scale. What are plausible equilibrium outcomes of this fitness contest? If we
appeal to rationality on the part of each firm, gametheoretic solution concepts are not helpful. Under
rationality, an environment characterized by perfect information will not permit a stable equilibrium in
random fitness contests in the sense that no best response or undominated strategies will emerge in the
absence of some evolutionary mechanism. Thus, a genetic embedding of behavioral phenotypes permits
coherent equilibrium outcomes in the sense that pairwise strategies in the population of firms will be stable
or unstable according to the gains to Darwinian fitness realized by each strategy.
Suppose the initial population of firms consists of Illiberals, and a rare mutant Liberal phenotype appears.
Under constant returns to scale can these Liberals successfully invade the population? Let the number of
these mutant Liberals in the population be p ε (0, 1). In random contests between two firms, the probability
that an opponent will be a Liberal (Illiberal) strategist is p (1 p ). Two propositions for this game follow
below.
Proposition 1: Under perfect competition where r = 1, the population of Illiberal strategists is stable
against invasion by mutant Liberal strategists.
If the population of Illiberals is to be stable against invasion, the Darwinian fitness of Illiberals must be
greater than that of Liberals. Let the Darwinian fitness of Illiberals and Liberals be F(I) and
F(L) respectively, then under constant returns to scale, evolutionary stability of the population of Illiberals
requires that F(I) > F(L) where:
F(I) = p × 0 + (1 p )(1r .50r)
F(L) = p (1r 1) + (1 p )(2r r2r )
If r = 1, π (I,L) = π (L,L), thus evolutionary stability requires (1 p )π (I,I) > (1 p )π (L,I), or:
(1 p ).50 > 0
Thus, for p < 1, the population of Illiberal strategists is stable against invasion by Liberal strategists. The
Illiberal strategy is also an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), defined as a strategy such that if, all
members of the population adopt it, no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of
natural selection [Maynard Smith, 1982]. Thus, a market environment characterized by constant returns to
scale in production does not provide conditions favorable for invasion by Liberal firms.
Proposition 2: If r is approximately.1988, the population of Illiberal strategists is not stable against
invasion by mutant Liberal strategists.
When r < 1, the fitness functions for Illiberals and Liberals are respectively:
F(I) = (1 p )(1r .50)
F(L) = p × (1r 1) + (1 p )(2r r2r ) = (1p)(2r r2r )
Invadability by Liberals requires:
(1 r)2r > 1 .50r

Taking the natural log of both sides, the difference F(L) F(I) is:
Differentiating D with respect to r and solving will yield the value of
r that maximizes the difference between F(L) and F(I) for r ≠ 1.:

simplifying results in the approximate quadratic equation:

with positive roots of approximately .1988 and 2.8014. The second order condition is negative with respect
to r =.1988, which establishes that the maximum positive distance between F(L) and F(I) occurs when there
are decreasing returns to scale. Thus, Liberal mutant firms can invade the population of Illiberals when
there are decreasing returns to scale in the sense that any existing population of Illiberal firms, when r
=.1988, is not evolutionary stable. In general, there is a range of values for r < 1, such that F(L) > F(I).
Proposition 2 merely establishes the existence of an r that permits Liberal firms to invade.

IV. Natural Selection and Replicator Dynamics
The ESS emphasizes the role of mutation, indicating the conditons under which rare phenotypes can invade
a population. If a rare phenotype is favored by natural selection, than the next generation will include such
phenotypes. To characterize replicator dynamics, it is assumed that reproduction is continuous. It is also
assumed that background fitness is zero, and that the profit of each firm results in a gain to fitness that
exceeds the constant date rate of δ in the population of firm owners. The difference between profit and the
death rate δ, determines the birth rate of firms. For a given state of the population, the payoff to a pure
strategy, and hence the gain to fitness is simply π (i,j). Two propositions characterizing natural selection
follow below.
Proposition 3: In a duopsonistic labor market with incumbent Illiberals, if there are constant returns to
scale in production the market cannot be populated in the longrun by Liberals.
For an initial population of Illiberal strategists with constant returns to scale, the number of Illiberals (nI )
and Liberals (nL ) will grow over time according to:

Given the solutions for n*I and n*L, the limit of the ratio n*L /n*I is:

where noL and noI are defined at t = 0.
Proposition 4: In a duopsonistic labor market with incumbent Illiberals, if r =.1988 (decreasing returns to
scale) the market cannot be populated in the longrun by Illiberals.

Under decreasing returns to scale, Darwinian fitness for Liberal firms is positive. If r =.1988, the number of
Illberals and Liberals will grow over time according to:

The limit of the ratio n*L /n*I is:

V. Conclusion
The approach adopted here is neither new or novel, per se. It does however cast further theoretical insight
upon how evolutionary processes can alter the traditional neoclassical outcomes where agents are presumed
to be rational actors. As Lane, Malerba, et. al (1995) argue, rationality imposes stringent conditions upon
the agents involved in a choice situation. In particular, neoclassical models usually offer a representation of
context as a choice situation without any consideration as to where the representation comes from. To
model discrimination as a taste is in a sense a representation without representation. If however, Darwinian
fitness is a relevant context for the human species, then to paraphase Mitchell (1995), evolution is a
representation of context that provides a method of searching among an enormous number of possibilities
for maximizing fitness. By embedding tastes in behavioral phenotypes that evolve through natural
selection, a more coherent context is provided for explaining the choices and behaviors that agents make in
the marketplace.
By modelling wage discrimination in an evolutionary framework, at least two insights about the nature of
such behavior are revealed. First, discrimination need not be pathological, or based on pure bigotry. The
results here suggest that discrimination by white firm owners against black labor represents a favorable
adaptation that promotes Darwinian fitness, in a given technological environment. Finally, the results show
that wage discrimination need not be based on rationality, where firm owners efficiently tradeoff black
employment for profit. In evolution, the efficiency promoting mechanism is not rational utility
maximization per se, instead it is natural selection.
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